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Appellants

Donald

M.

Dudley

and

Ruf,

Inc.

("Buyers")

respectfully submit this Reply Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
VR Utah, Inc. d/b/a VR Business Brokers ("Broker"), and Icelandic
Investment, Inc. and Robert Johnson

("Sellers") enforcing the

fraudulently induced Purchase Transaction Agreement. The evidence
established that both Broker and Sellers knew about yet failed to
disclose the existence of the litigation pending against the entity
purchased by Buyers. The evidence further established that Broker
advised and persuaded Sellers to affirmatively misrepresent to
Buyers that there was no pending litigation. Thus, the trial court
erred in enforcing this fraudulently induced agreement and its
provisions.
The trial court erred in ruling that a limited release
provision
Transaction

contained

in

Agreement

fraudulent conduct.

the

fraudulently

protected

Broker

from

induced

its affirmative

First, the Release provision was subject to

rescission as it was contained in an admittedly
induced agreement.

Purchase

fraudulently

Second, the language of the release provision

does not exculpate Broker from liability for fraudulent conduct.
Finally, the release provision was void as a matter of law because
public policy does not permit a covenant of immunity which will
protect a person against his own fraud.
The trial court further erred in find that Buyers did not rely
on the misrepresentation that there was no pending litigation
1

against the entity they were purchasing.

Buyers' reliance was

expressly contemplated, intended and acknowledged in the terms of
the Purchase Transaction Agreement itself.

Moreover, there was

evidence that there being no litigation was extremely important to
Buyers and that they would not have entered into the Purchase
Transaction Agreement or signed the corresponding promissory notes
if that warranty had not been made.

Finally, Broker owed Buyers a

duty of honesty and full disclosure which they breached when they
failed

to

disclose

(and

encouraged

misrepresent) the pending litigation.

Sellers

to

affirmatively

Such fraudulent omission

does not require a showing of reliance under Utah law and the trial
court's ruling to the contrary was error.
The trial court further erred in ruling that Buyers were not
damaged by the fraud.

First, as a matter of procedure, the trial

court erred in relying on this basis as this issue was not raised
until Broker's reply memorandum.

Second, there was substantial

evidence of damages incurred by Buyers, including:

Buyers were

damaged as the value of the entity they purchased which was subject
to a lawsuit seeking in excess of $88,000 was obviously less than
the same entity with no pending litigation as represented;

Buyers

were damaged as they lost their funding source which was contingent
on their being no pending litigation against

the entity being

purchased; and Buyers were damaged when they were named as parties
to the pending litigation and forced to obtain representation and
defend themselves in the litigation.

2

Finally,

the

trial

court

erred

in

enforcing

a Default

provision and finding that Sellers, having admitted making an
intentional misrepresentation to induce Buyers to enter into the
Purchase Transaction Agreement, were not liable to Buyers because
Buyers failed to notify Sellers of their "right to cure" the
default.

First, the Default provision is unenforceable as it was

contained in the Purchase Transaction Agreement and induced by
fraud.

Second, as a matter of law Sellers cannot hide behind the

Default provision to protect themselves from their own fraud.
Third, the language of the Default provision did not apply to
misrepresentations of existing facts and, in any event, it could
not be cured.

Finally, even if the Default provision applied,

Sellers did not cure the default within thirty

(30) days as

required under that provision and that is fatal to their claim.1
In sum, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
Buyers'

claims

for

fraud

in

the

inducement

and

negligent

misrepresentation against both Sellers and Broker. Moreover, given
the fraudulently induced agreement, the trial court also erred in
granting summary judgment against Buyers on the counterclaims of
Sellers and Broker, both of which were based on the fraudulently
induced agreement. Accordingly, the trial court's rulings granting
summary judgment in favor of Sellers and Broker should be reversed
and the case remanded for further proceedings.
1

The undisputed evidence established that Sellers had
actual notice yet failed to terminate the litigation for more than
eighteen (18) months after the parties entered into the Purchase
Transaction Agreement, and more than eight (8) months after
receiving Buyers' notice of rescission.
3

I.

BROKERS 1 ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL ARE WITHOUT MERIT AND
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE REVERSED.

Broker makes three
court's

summary

Liability set

judgment

(3) arguments in support of the trial
in its

favor:

(1)

The Release

forth in Article XX of the Purchase

of

Transaction

Agreement Is Not Subject To Rescission And Exculpates Broker From
Its Misconduct;
upon

the

Sellers'

participated
failed

to

(2) Buyers failed to present evidence of reliance
misrepresentation

in

which

and upon the omission by Broker; and

present

evidence

of

damages.

These

the

Broker

(3)

Buyers

arguments

are

addressed in turn.
1.

The Release Of Liability Contained In The Fraudulently
Induced Purchase Transaction Agreement Cannot Protect
Broker From Its Own Misconduct And, Moreover, It Is
Subject To Rescission.

The record evidence before the trial court established that at
the time of the Purchase Transaction the Sellers knew about the
pending Associated Factors Lawsuit and not only failed to disclose
that litigation but affirmatively represented that there was no
such litigation.

See Brief of Appellant at pp. 3-6.

The evidence

further established that the Sellers discussed the existence of the
Associated Factors Lawsuit with Broker yet Broker did not disclose
that litigation to Buyers and, in fact, Broker persuaded Sellers
not to disclose the pendency of the litigation.

Id.

Broker now argues that despite the record evidence of its
intentional fraudulent conduct, summary judgment in its favor was
proper because of the Release provision set forth in Article XX of

4

the Purchase Transaction Agreement. That argument is fundamentally
flawed in several respects.
A.

The Release Provision
Is Part And Parcel Of A
Fraudulently Induced Contract That Is Subject To
Rescission And, Therefore, The Release Is Void.

First

of

all,

Broker

cannot

escape

liability

for

its

misconduct based on a provision set forth in a fraudulently induced
agreement.
Purchase

Because of the material misrepresentation, the entire
Transaction

rescission.

Agreement

is

voidable

and

subject

to

E.g. , American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 235 P.2d 361,

363 (Utah 1951);

Conder v. A.L. Williams &Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d

634, 639 (Utah App. 1987) ("plaintiff in an action for fraud has the
option to elect to rescind the transaction and recover the purchase
price or to affirm the transaction and recover damages")(citing
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247

(Utah 1980));

Perkins v.

Coombs, 769 P. 2d 269, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (same and noting the
choice of remedy belongs to defrauded party);
590

P.2d

principles,

304,

307-308

the

Release

(Utah

1979)(same).

provision

Transaction Agreement is also void.
P. 2d 602, 608

contained

Mecham v. Benson,
Under
in

the

the

same

Purchase

E.g., Lamb v. Bangard, 525

(Utah 1974) ("A contract limitation on damages or

remedies is valid only in the absence of allegations or proof of
fraud.")(citations omitted);

Ong Intern.

(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th

Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 454 (Utah 1993) (releases which are part
of a scheme to defraud or contained in a fraudulently

5

induced

contract are likewise voidable). 2

Accordingly, the trial court

erred in granting Broker's motion for summary judgment enforcing
the Release provision.
B.

The Release Provision Language, Even If It Was Not Void
Because It Was Induced By Fraud, Does Not Encompass
Broker's Fraudulent Conduct.

Second,

the

language

of

the

Release

provision

does

not

exculpate Broker from its fraudulent conduct. That language as set
forth in Article XX of the Purchase Transaction Agreement is as
follows:
By signing this Agreement, BUYER hereby acknowledges that
BUYER is relying solely on BUYER'S own inspection of the
business and the representations of SELLER and not on [Broker]
with regard to the prior operating history of the business,
the value of the assets being purchased and all other material
facts of SELLER in making this offer. BUYER acknowledges that
Broker
has
not verified,
and will
not verify,
the
representations of SELLER and should any representations be
untrue, BUYER agrees to look solely to SELLER for relief and
to indemnify Broker and hold Broker harmless in connection
with all losses and damages caused BUYER thereby.
Under this provision the Broker was not required to verify the
representations made by the Seller and Buyers agreed not to require
the Broker to do so.

It does not follow, however, that because the

2

Broker's reliance on this Court's opinion in Otsuka is
misplaced.
In Otsuka, a party raised a fraud defense to a claim
based on a forbearance agreement which was entered into subsequent
to the agreement induced by fraud. This Court ruled that the fraud
defense must be raised against the document upon which a party is
being sued. Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists,
Inc. , 937 P.2d 1274, 1278-1279 (Utah App. 1997) (fraud is not
defense to forbearance agreement entered into without fraud and
subsequent to the fraudulently induced agreement). In the present
case, however, the release agreement is set forth in the Purchase
Transaction Agreement, the very agreement that was induced by
fraud. Accordingly, the Release provision is subject to rescission
and the trial court's summary judgment rulings to the contrary must
be reversed.
6

Broker

is not verifying the Sellers1

representations

that the

Broker can advise and encourage Sellers to misrepresent material
facts as Broker did in this case.

No buyer reading this language

in a purchase agreement would understand he was releasing Broker
from intentional misrepresentations by the Sellers which resulted
from Broker ! s advice and insistence.

Yet the evidence establishes

that is what happened here.
Moreover, the language cannot be read to relieve Broker from
its duty as an agent under Utah law owed to Buyers to act honestly,
ethically and competently, e.g., Duaan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 1239,
1248 (Utah 1980) (citing Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d
802, 805 (1962)), and a prospective buyer certainly would not read
the Release provision that way.
Thus,
rescission

even

if

because

the
it

Release

provision

is contained

in a

was

not

subject

fraudulently

to

induced

agreement, Broker is not relieved from liability by the Release
provision contained in that agreement and summary judgment was
improperly entered against Buyers.
C.

The Release Provision Cannot Limit Broker 1 s Liability For
Its Misconduct.

Third, the Release provision cannot exculpate Broker from
liability as a matter of public policy.

The Utah Supreme Court

ruled:
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will
protect a person against his own fraud on the grounds of
public policy. A contract limitation on damages or remedies
is valid only in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud.

7

Oner Int'l (USA). Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah
1993) (emphasis added) (citing Lamb v. Banaart. 525 P. 2d 602, 608
(Utah 1974) ) . 3

The 1 aw simply does not allow a party to a

contract to obtain a contractual provision by fraud and then seek
to hide behind the protection of the provision when challenged with
the fraud.
Release

Yet the trial court expressly ruled that under the

provision

of Article

XX

"[Buyer]

expressly

relieved

[Broker] of any legal duties arising from the described conduct,
i.e., seller's representations or misrepresentations."
That ruling is directly contrary to Utah 1 aw.

[R605-606] .

Thus# even if the

Purchase Transaction Agreement was not subject to rescission and
even if the language of the Release provision could be construed to
encompass Broker's fraudulent conduct, the trial court erred in
finding that the Release provision relieved Broker of liability for
its own fraud or for the Sellers' fraud which Broker expressly
encouraged and assisted. The trial court's order granting Broker's
motion for summary judgment must be reversed.
2.

There Was More Than Sufficient Evidence Of Buyers'
Reliance On The Admitted Misrepresentation Regarding
Pending Litigation To Defeat Summary Judgment.

Broker next argues that the Buyers did not rely on the
misrepresentation that there was no pending litigation against
3

It should be noted that the Utah Supreme Court in Ong
refused to enforce a broad release provision that released "any and
all claims, demands, rights of action or causes of action, whether
known or unknown, howsoever arising, which in any way are based
upon or related to [defendant's] association with the [plaintiff] ."
Ong, 850 P.2d at 451. Clearly if the Court refused to relieve a
party from its own fraud under such a broadly worded provision, the
very narrow Release provision in the case at bar cannot relieve
Broker of its liability for its misconduct.
8

Seller Icelandic at the time of the Purchase Transaction Agreement.
The record evidence before the trial court, however, established
Buyers' reliance. For instance, the parties expressly contemplated
and intended such reliance. Article IX of the Purchase Transaction
Agreement expressly states that:
"BUYER may rely on the same to enter into this transaction,
each and all of the following: . . . That there are no known
. . . litigation proceedings against SELLER, which have arisen
in connection with its conduct of the business.
[R15-16]

Thus, it was known by both Broker and the Sellers that

Buyers were relying on the representations of Sellers that there
was no known litigation.

Armed with this knowledge, Broker chose

to

Sellers

advise

litigation
Buyers,

and

persuade

to

and, moreover, despite

the

Broker

also

chose

not

its

not

disclose

fiduciary
to

the

pending

obligation

disclose

the

to

pending

litigation. Under the express language of the Purchase Transaction
Agreement, therefore, the Buyers demonstrated that they relied on
the misrepresentation and summary judgment was improperly granted.
In addition, there was other record evidence that the lack of
outstanding litigation against Sellers was extremely important to
Buyers and that they would not have entered into the Purchase
Transaction

Agreement

or

signed

warranty was not in the agreement.
at %% 4-6

& 12] .

the promissory

notes

if

that

[E.g., R4-7, 432-440, 866-867

Moreover, it is common sense that

someone

purchasing a business will rely on a representation that there is
no pending litigation against that entity.

That conclusion is

bolstered in this case by the fact that the lack of outstanding

9

litigation

was

so

critical

to

Buyers

that

it

was

expressly

addressed in the Purchase Transaction Agreement.
In spite of this clear evidence that Buyers relied on the
representation that there was no litigation pending against Seller,
Broker

argues

that

the

finding of reliance.

Release

provision

somehow

precludes

a

To the contrary, that provision bolsters

Buyers' position that it relied on Sellers' misrepresentation made
at Broker's behest:
. . . BUYER is relying solely on BUYER'S own inspection of the
business and the representations of SELLER. . . .
That

language

expressly

states,

as

does

the

portion

of

the

agreement wherein the misrepresentation regarding litigation is set
forth, that Buyers are relying on this representation
representation

Brokers

Transaction Agreement.

induced)

in entering

into

(the false

the

Purchase

Based on the foregoing, it was error for

the trial court to find as a matter of law that Buyers did not rely
on Sellers' misrepresentation that there was no pending litigation,
which misrepresentation was expressly encouraged and assisted by
Broker, and the trial court's ruling must be reversed.
Finally, under Utah law Broker can be held liable for its
failure to disclose the known litigation to Buyers.

Broker, as

agent of Buyers, owed Buyers duties of honesty, good faith and
disclosure.

E.g., Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d

1239, 1248

(Utah

1980) (citing Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 802, 805
(1962);

Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 881-882 (Utah

1983) . Despite these duties, Broker not only encouraged Seller to
affirmatively misrepresent there was no pending litigation, Broker
10

failed to disclose the litigation to Sellers. Broker's fraudulent
nondisclosure of this material fact is actionable and, as a matter
of law, reliance need not be shown. E.g., First Sec. Bank of Utah
N.A.

v.

Banberry

Dev.

Corp.,

786

P.2d

1326,

1328

(Utah

1990)(actionable fraud based on nondisclosure requires only a
showing that the omitted fact was material); McDougal v. Weed, 945
P. 2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997) (concealment of material facts is
fraudulent concealment).
record

evidence

Thus, even if one were to disregard the
of

misrepresentation/omission,

Buyers 1
the

reliance

Broker's

on

concealment

the
of

the

existence of the litigation was actionable and precluded the
summary judgment entered by the trial court.
3.

The Trial Court Erred In Ruling That, As A Matter Of Law,
Buyers Were Not Damaged By The Fraud.

Broker next argues that the trial court's summary judgment was
proper because Buyers failed to show they had been damaged as a
result of the misrepresentation.

That argument is flawed in

several respects.
A.

Brokerfs Summary Judgment Motion Did Not Raise The Issue
Of Damages And, Therefore, It Was Error For The Trial
Court To Grant Summary Judgment On That Basis.

First, the element of damages was not raised in Broker's
motion for summary judgment [R382-384] or its initial memorandum
supporting that motion [R385-397]; therefore, it was improper for
the trial court to rule against Buyers on this element.

The only

element of Buyers' fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims
discussed by Broker in its summary judgment motion prior to its
reply was the element of reliance.
11

[R394-396]

Not only was

Broker's summary judgment motion not based on a claimed lack of
damages, there was no mention of damages in the statement of facts
purportedly supporting the motion. The motion clearly was based on
the Release provision, not on any claimed lack of damages.

Given

that the damages issue was not raised and Broker set forth no
evidence that Buyers were not damaged, Buyers were not obligated to
produce any evidence of damages and the trial court's summary
judgment ruling to the contrary is error.
56(b) & (e) ;

E.g., Utah R. Civ. P.

Parrish v. Lavton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah

1975)(party opposing summary judgment can rest on pleadings when
moving party does not support motion with affidavits);

Gadd v.

Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984)(counter-affidavits not required
when moving party does not file affidavits supporting motion).
After Buyers responded to Broker's summary judgment motion
that did not raise the issue of damages, Broker's reply argued for
the first time that summary judgment was proper as Buyers failed to
introduce evidence of damages. A basis for summary judgment cannot
be raised for the first time on reply, however, and the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment on the damages issue.
B.

There Was More Than Sufficient Evidence Of Damage To
Buyers To Defeat The Broker's Summary Judgment Motion.

Second, there was sufficient evidence of damages to defeat the
motion in any event.

In opposing a summary judgment motion, it is

not necessary to establish a damages claim with precision and a
party need only demonstrate they can produce evidence that would
reasonably

support

a finding

in their

favor on this issue.

Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1991);
12

Kranz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 & 356 (Utah 1991) . Such evidence
is clearly established in this case.

The value of an entity being

sued for more than $88,000 (more than the purchase price agreed to
by Buyers) plus punitive damages is far less than the same entity
with no pending litigation.
thing as represented

Such difference in value between the

and the thing as it actually exists are

damages that clearly support fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims.

E.g., Schuhman v. Green River Motel, 835 P.2d 992, 994-997

(Utah App. 1992)(rescission based on fraudulent misrepresentation
proper where surroundings of entity purchased misrepresented to
appear more desirable than they actually were);

Ong, 850 P.2d at

453,-455 (rescission based on fraud proper where business entity as
existed worth less than entity as represented);
&

Cas.

Ins.

Co.

1980)(rescission

v.

of

Mardanlou,

607

P.2d

Prudential Prop.

291,

292-293

insurance agreement proper where

(Utah

applicant

failed to disclose material fact regarding prior insurance which
changed

risk

to

insurance

company);

Callister

v.

Millstream

Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 663-664 (Utah App. 1987) (rescission
proper where property conveyed had encumbrance contrary to sellers'
representation).
Buyers were further damaged as the record evidence before the
trial court established that Buyers lost their funding source as a
direct and proximate result of this fraud as Buyers' financing for
the Purchase Transaction was contingent on there being no pending
litigation against the Seller Icelandic, and when it came to light
that there was pending litigation despite the representation to the
13

contrary, the lender withdrew future funding.
870, 1167-1172]4

Further,

Buyers

[R5-7, 853-854, 864-

incurred

damage

when,

in

September, 1991, Buyer Ruf, Inc. was added as a defendant in the
Associated Factors Lawsuit and had to retain counsel and defend
itself in that substantial litigation.
899]

[R437-438, 830, 868, 895-

Clearly the foregoing demonstrates there was sufficient

evidence of damages to preclude summary judgment even had Broker
properly raised the issue in its summary judgment motion. Billings
v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1991);

Kranz v.

Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 & 356 (Utah 1991). Thus, the trial court's
entry of summary judgment against Buyers on their fraud in the
inducement claim was error.
II.

SELLERS' ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL ARE WITHOUT MERIT AND THE
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE REVERSED.

Sellers make two (2) arguments in support of the trial court's
summary judgment in their favor:

(1)

evidence

from

of

damages

resulting

Buyers failed to present
the

admitted

material

misrepresentation; and (2) The Default provision contained in the

4

Broker argues that this evidence should not be considered
because it was filed in response to Sellers' motion for summary
judgment which was briefed subsequent to Broker's motion. This
evidence is properly considered with respect to Broker's motion,
however, as the court's summary judgment ruling in favor of Broker
was not final and was "subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Moreover,
such evidence should have been considered in connection with
Buyers' Motion for New Trial which was filed for the express
purpose of having the trial court consider damages evidence which
Buyers could not previously present given Broker's raising of the
damages issue in its reply memorandum. Thus, this evidence should
have been considered and it precludes the trial court's summary
j udgment rulings.
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fraudulently induced Purchase Transaction Agreement was not voided
by the fraud and it insulates Sellers from their fraud and bars
Buyers1 claims. These arguments are addressed in turn.
1.
To

There Was More Than Sufficient Evidence Of Damage To
Buyers 1 To Defeat Sellers' Summary Judgment Motion.
defeat

a

summary

judgment

motion,

establish a damages claim with precision.

a

party

need

not

Instead, they need only

demonstrate they can produce evidence that would reasonably support
a finding in their favor on this issue.

Billings v. Union Bankers

Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1991);
352, 353 & 356 (Utah 1991).

Kranz v. Holt, 819 P.2d

As set forth fully, supra at pp. 12-

14, there was clear evidence that the Buyers were damaged as a
result of the undisclosed lawsuit seeking more than $88,000 plus
punitive damages against the business being purchased.
damaged

by

the

diminished

value

of

the

entity

Buyers were

subjected

to

litigation, they were damaged when they were named as parties and
forced to retain counsel and defend themselves in that litigation,
and Buyers were damaged when they lost their financing for the
purchase and continued operation of the business.
In response to this abundant evidence, Sellers argue that
summary judgment was proper as Buyers failed to "prove a material
loss of profits", citing Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268
P.2d 988, 989 (1954) . 5

Sellers statement of the law, however, is

5

Sellers repeatedly cite to evidence in support of their
argument that was not part of the record before the trial court.
In fact, Sellers1 brief does not have a single factual cite to any
record evidence before the trial court and, pursuant to Rule 24(e)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, such evidence cannot be
considered on appeal.
15

incorrect.

The

Davis

case

involves

materiality

of

a

misrepresentation (not damages) and has absolutely no relevance to
this case as it is undisputed that the misrepresentation/omission
was of a material fact.
arguing

about

whether

It appears as though Sellers are not

Buyers

were

damaged

(which was

clearly

established by the evidence before the trial court), but argue
instead that Buyers failed to show precisely the amount of those
damages.

As set forth above, damages need not be established with

absolute certainty or precision, but only that damage has occurred.
That requirement is clearly satisfied by the fact that the Buyers
lost

a

funding

undisclosed

source,

litigation,

had
and

to

hire

received

counsel
an

to

entity

oppose

the

embroiled

in

litigation which obviously was worth less than the value of the
entity as represented.
law

in

a

Schuhman,

fraud
835

or

Such damages are sufficient as a matter of
negligent

P. 2d at

misrepresentation

994-997

case.

(rescission based on

E.g. ,

fraudulent

misrepresentation proper where surroundings of entity purchased
misrepresented to appear more desirable than they actually were);
Oner, 850 P. 2d at 453,-455 (rescission based on fraud proper where
business entity as existed worth less than entity as represented) ;
Mardanlou, 601 P. 2d at 292-293
rescission

simply

because

(insurance agreement subject to

insured

failed

insurance cancellation on application);
Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 663-664

to

disclose

prior

Callister v. Millstream

(Utah App. 1987) (rescission

proper where property conveyed had encumbrance contrary to sellers'
representation).

Thus, summary judgment in favor of Sellers both

16

on Buyers1 claims and against Buyers on the promissory notes was
improper and should be reversed.
2.

The Default Provision Did Not Apply To A Fraudulent
Misrepresentation And, Even If It Did, The Undisputed
Evidence Showed That Sellers Did Not Cure Default For
Several Years.

Sellers1 remaining argument on appeal is that the trial court
properly granted summary judgment enforcing the promissory notes
and against Buyers' claims under the Default provision set forth in
Article VIII of the Purchase Transaction Agreement.6

In essence,

the Sellers' logic is that a party to a contract containing a
default provision can effectively make unlimited misrepresentations
to induce the other party to enter into the contract so long as
those misrepresentations are either undetected or cured as provided
in the default provision.

Such an unjust result is contrary to law

and the trial court erred in finding that this Default provision
was enforceable, applicable, and a bar to Buyers' claims.
A.
As

The Default Provision Is Not Enforceable As The Agreement
Was Induced By Fraud.
a matter

of

misrepresentation

of

law, a contract
existing

induced

material

by

fact

rescission at the election of the defrauded party.

6

a

is

fraudulent
subject

to

E.g., American

That provision provides in pertinent part:
In the event any party to this Agreement defaults on any term
or provision incorporated herein, including any provision of any
Exhibit attached hereto, the non-defaulting party shall give the
defaulting party a written notice requiring that such default be
cured within thirty (30) days after receipt of said written
notice. . . . After such period, the non-defaulting parties may
take the remedies set forth in this Agreement and any attachments
hereto. . . . [R15]
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Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 235 P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1951);

Conder v.

A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 639 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) ("plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to elect to
rescind the transaction and recover the purchase price or to affirm
the transaction and recover damages") (citing Ducran v. Jones, 615
P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980)) . The undisputed evidence establishes
that Buyers were fraudulently induced to enter into the Purchase
Transaction

by Appellees' misrepresentations

regarding

pending

litigation and that Buyers, upon learning of the fraud, immediately
issued

a

written

notice

of

rescission.

Thus,

the

Purchase

Transaction Agreement (including the Default provision) was voided
and unenforceable.
Additionally, the Sellers sought (and the trial court obliged)
the enforcement and protection of a contractual provision which was
obtained by an affirmative and material misrepresentation that no
litigation

existed.

A

party

to a

contract

cannot

obtain

a

contractual provision by fraud and then seek to hide behind the
protection of the provision when challenged with the fraud.

As the

Utah Supreme Court has expressly stated:
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will
protect a person against his own fraud on the grounds of
public policy.
A contract limitation on damages or
remedies is valid only in the absence of allegations or
proof of fraud.
Ong Int'l (USA), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah
1993)(emphasis added).
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B.

The "Default" Could Not Be
Provision Is Inapplicable.

Even

if

limitations

the

set

law were

ignored

Cured

and

And

the

The

Default

obligations

and

forth in the Default provision were somehow

enforceable, the Default provision has no application as the fraud
could not be cured and the provision was obviously not intended to
apply to misrepresentations made to induce the other party to enter
into

the

litigation

agreement.7
against

Transaction.

the

The

"default"

Seller

at

the

was
time

the
of

existence
the

This default simply could not be cured

of

Purchase
--

the

litigation was in existence at the time of purchase and that fact
could not be changed. Moreover, to rule that the Default provision
allowed Sellers an opportunity to cure their misrepresentation
would emasculate
contract.8

the affirmative representations made in the

Accordingly, the Default provision allowing the cure

of a default is not applicable as Sellers could not cure this
defect brought about by their blatant fraud.

7

As the language of the Default provision indicates, the
provision was only intended to apply to defaults that arose after
the execution of the agreement (i.e., "[i]n the event any party to
this Agreement defaults on any term or provision") . Thus, the
Default provision is inapplicable.
8

Moreover, it would be bad public policy as recognized by
the Utah Supreme Court in the Oner case. Such a ruling would allow
contracting parties to make unlimited misrepresentations to induce
another party to enter into an agreement and then require the
defrauded party to discover the fraud, provide written notice, and
then only hold the defrauder liable if they could not cure the
default within a month. This result would be unjust, illogical and
would eviscerate the value of any representations made in a
contract.
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C.

The Default Provision Does Not Provide Protection For
Sellers As They Had Notice Of The Default.

Even

if the Default provision were enforceable

and the

existence of litigation was something that could be cured, the
Sellers failed to cure the "default" as provided under Article VIII
and summary judgment was improper.

The purpose of the Default

provision was to provide the defaulting party with notice so they
could effectively cure the default within 3 0 days.

The undisputed

evidence in this case establishes, however, the Sellers had actual
notice of the "default" (i.e. , the pending litigation) at the time
they signed the Purchase Transaction Agreement.

Despite this

actual notice the Associated Factors Lawsuit was not settled for
more than a year and a half after the parties entered into the
Purchase Transaction Agreement. Moreover, even if actual knowledge
of the default does not satisfy the technical requirement of the
Default provision, the undisputed evidence shows that on September
23, 1991 Buyers sent Sellers a written notice of rescission of the
Purchase Transaction identifying the outstanding litigation as the
basis.

[R438, 628, 868] Clearly this letter satisfied the written

notice requirement of the Default provision as it placed Sellers on
notice

of

the

default.

Despite

this

notice,

however,

the

Associated Factors Lawsuit was not settled until June, 1992, more
than eight (8) months after the notice. Thus, even if the Default
provision were somehow enforceable and the default was curable, the
undisputed evidence shows that Sellers did not "cure" the default
within the thirty
provision.

(3 0) period as required under the Default

Such failure is fatal to Sellers' claim.
20

Callister v.

Millstream Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 664 (Utah App. 1987)("Even
assuming plaintiffs were entitled to additional time to clear the
encumbrance, it is fatal to their position that they did not
actually clear it.11)9.

Thus, the trial court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of Sellers was reversible error on this basis as
well.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BUYERS' MOTION TO AMEND
TO ADD CLAIM OF RESCISSION AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

Buyers' initial Brief sets forth at pages 33-36 the reasons
the trial court erred in denying Buyers' motion to amend to add a
claim

of

rescission

and motion

for new trial.

Nothing

in

Appellees' responsive briefs alters the conclusion of that analysis
that neither of those motions should have been denied.10

Thus,

Buyers will not burden the Court by reciting those arguments again
and instead incorporates them by reference.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Buyers'
claims for fraud in the inducement and negligent misrepresentation
against both Sellers and Broker. Moreover, given the fraudulently
induced agreement, the trial court also erred in granting summary

9

Not only did Sellers fail to cure the "default" for more
than 18 months after they affirmatively misrepresented there was no
pending litigation, they presented no evidence that they could cure
it within the 3 0-days under the Default provision.
Even more
telling, however, is the fact that they did not terminate the
litigation within the 3 0-day period. Thus, their reliance on the
Default provision is misplaced. Id.
10

In fact, neither of the Appellees now seem to dispute
that Buyers had a claim for rescission that was decided by the
trial court.
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judgment against Buyers on the counterclaims of Sellers and Broker,
both of which were based on the fraudulently induced agreement.
Accordingly, the trial court's rulings granting summary judgment in
favor of Sellers and Broker should be reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 2&~

day of October, 1998.
ATKIN & LILJA, P.C.
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